Shocking! Investigation Reveals Launching Gantry Crane Collapse onto Train at Sikhiu Left 31 Dead, Never Inspected During Operation

Shocking! Investigation Reveals Launching Gantry Crane Collapse onto Train at Sikhiu Left 31 Dead, Never Inspected During Operation, Failed to Replace Support Steel on Schedule, No On-Site Engineer

May 26, 2025 – Deputy Secretary-General of the Ministry of Transport Jiraphong Theppitag announced investigation results into the Thai-Chinese high-speed railway construction crane that collapsed onto Express Train No. 21 running between Bangkok and Ubon Ratchathani, in the area between Nong Nam Khun and Sikhiu stations in Nakhon Ratchasima province on January 14, resulting in 31 deaths and 71 injuries.

Jiraphong stated that after an intensive 45-day investigation, the engineering accident was caused by a Launching Gantry crane—a mobile steel bridge that lifts hundreds of tons of concrete segments to place them sequentially. The crane stands on three support legs with clear procedures requiring that before moving forward, the middle leg must first be brought close to the front leg to help bear the load together.

However, on the day of the incident, workers bypassed this procedure and immediately ordered the crane to move. This caused over 700 tons of weight to press down on the front leg alone. The support steel (PT Bar) could not withstand the force and broke, causing the crane foundation to collapse onto the train passing below.

The committee found this was not a single worker's error but a systemic failure involving all parties:

Party 1: Contractor (Italian-Thai Construction Company)

1.1 Bypassed established procedures in the manual by failing to move the middle leg close to the front leg before operating the crane—a mandatory step in the work procedure. Site engineers and work supervisors admitted they regularly omitted this step.

1.2 Work commenced without authorization. The site engineer instructed the team to start at 08:00 without waiting for work approval and without notifying the supervising engineer, claiming the supervisor was late.

1.3 Failed to request train service closure. There was no notification to Thai Railways to suspend train operations while working above the railway tracks, despite the contract clearly requiring this. The only evidence found was a request for Window Time between January 20-30, which was after the incident date.

1.4 Failed to replace support steel on schedule. The construction supervision consultant (CSC) had circulated notices since 2023 requiring PT Bar support steel replacement every 60 operational cycles, but the contractor claimed not to know despite previous incidents in 2023 on the Rama II Expressway Project generating similar warning notices.

1.5 Failed to conduct crane safety inspections according to legal schedules every three months. Inspection cycles were found to be delayed, and certification documents only covered 1 of 4 lifting equipment sets that should have been inspected.

Party 2: Construction Supervision Consultant (CSC)

2.1 No full-time on-site engineer or safety officer. CSC's safety staff visited the site only 1-2 times per week, and the supervising engineer was not constantly present.

2.2 Clear behavioral violations were found: work approvals were signed in advance for multiple days at a time, and backdated signatures were found up to three weeks late. CSC management was aware but took no corrective action, constituting serious dereliction of duty.

2.3 The crane was never inspected throughout its operational period. Neither CSC engineers nor safety staff ever directly inspected the crane's condition and operating procedures, not even once.

Party 3: State Railway of Thailand (SRT)

3.1 Overloaded assignments. The project engineer supervising Contract 3-4 where the incident occurred was assigned to oversee five contracts simultaneously, while other contracts with more intensive oversight had one-to-one engineer assignments. As a result, Contract 3-4 received inadequate supervision.