Police Colonel Demands Return of Water Authority to Local Governments
Police Colonel Thavee Sodsong of the Prachachat Party called for water‑management authority to be returned to local governments, criticizing the centralized National Water Resources Committee and Office of National Water Resources for planning a 660‑billion‑baht water budget (2017‑2027) while flood‑affected communities struggle. He questioned whether the huge spending improves safety and how much reaches the localities that need it, urging transparent criteria and faster decision‑making.
Police Colonel Thavee Sodsong, leader of the Prachachat Party, called for the return of water‑management authority to local administrations, disclosing that the National Water Resources Committee (NWRC) and the Office of National Water Resources (ONWR) have drafted an integrated water‑resource management plan for 2017‑2027 with a total budget exceeding 660 billion baht.
On October 10, 2026, he posted on his personal Facebook, urging the devolution of water authority. He argued that the NWRC and ONWR, bound by a centralized state water system, must release power to localities. He described how flooded homes lose income while expenses persist, causing distress in Bangkok and other areas, leading citizens to demand assistance, some even shouting at national leaders. He stressed that the government must listen, because behind the anger lies damaged property, closed businesses, lost workdays, and uncertain recovery funding.
While citizens bear their losses, the integrated water‑resource management plan for 2017‑2027, as compiled from documents, amounts to over 660 billion baht—about 60 billion baht per year, including figures from draft budget documents. He asked how much this budget actually improves public safety and how much is allocated to the localities that need to implement relief efforts on the ground.
The National Water Resources Committee (NWRC) and the Office of National Water Resources (ONWR) are tasked with creating unity in water management, but unity must be demonstrated through timely decisions, clear responsibility, and transparent budget allocation. If the process adds layers above operational agencies while localities still lack funding, equipment, and personnel, the integrated system risks becoming a “state within a state” that separates authority from those accountable to the public.
Frontline officials often lack the necessary tools, while central decision‑makers remain distant from the suffering, so it is essential to disclose the criteria used to prioritize projects, who receives funding, and how benefits reach the public.
The Constitution, Sections 249 and 250, guarantees local self‑governance and sets mechanisms for devolving duties, authority, budgets, and personnel. Meanwhile, the Water Resources Act, B.E. 2561, Section 17(2) empowers the NWRC to approve integrated water‑management action plans and budgets for submission to the Cabinet, with the ONWR reviewing, commenting, and coordinating. Section 19 requires the NWRC to revise or update action plans to match reality.
Thus, simply saying “there is no budget because it is not in the plan” is insufficient; one must also state who will adjust the plan, when, and how the public will be assisted in the interim.
If the planning and budgeting process funnels through the ONWR and becomes a bottleneck, added steps and prolonged decision‑making will delay solutions, especially for projects that require central support for localities—while public distress cannot wait.
Moreover, implementation still relies on existing departments and agencies, so it must be made clear who decides, who acts, and who bears responsibility for delays.
Multiple‑level committees, numerous plans, and layered procedures must prove they reduce losses commensurately with the increase in administrative costs.
A congressional committee report on studying water‑management systems, submitted to the House of Representatives, recommends that localities receive dedicated budgets, specialized staff, and engineering mentorship for water sources, and that localities assuming transferred tasks become budget‑receiving units able to request maintenance funding, with regulations allowing other agencies to assist fully.
These procedures and proposals reflect the key principle that transferring functions must also transfer the capacity to perform them; therefore, any lack of readiness at the local level must be met with serious investment to build capacity.